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To utilize public resources efficiently, it is required to 
take full advantage of competition in public procurement 
auctions. Joint bidding practices are one of the possible 
ways of facilitating auction competition. In theory, 
there are pros and cons. It may enable firms to pool 
their financial and experiential resources and remove 
barriers to entry. On the other hand, it may reduce 
the degree of competition and can be used as a cover 
for collusive behavior. The paper empirically addresses 
whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in 
Official Development Assistance procurement auctions 
for infrastructure projects. It reveals the possible risk 
This paper—a product of the Economics Unit, Finance, Economics and Urban Development Department—is part of a 
larger effort in the department to understand and examine efficiency and effectiveness in public infrastructure procurement. 
Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted 
at aiimi@worldbank.org.  
of relying too much on a foreign bidding coalition and 
may suggest the necessity of overseeing it. The data 
reveal no strong evidence that joint bidding practices 
are compatible with competition policy, except for a 
few cases. In road procurements, coalitional bidding 
involving both local and foreign firms has been found 
pro-competitive. In the water and sewage sector, local 
joint bidding may be useful to draw out better offers 
from potential contractors. Joint bidding composed 
of only foreign companies is mostly considered anti-
competitive. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
 
Aid effectiveness largely rests on efficiency in the public procurement systems of recipient 
countries. Our companion paper (Estache and Iimi, 2008) suggests that promoting 
competition at auctions is a key to reduce procurement costs. The potential benefits that the 
developing world could receive are estimated at as much as 8.2 percent of total annual 
investment in infrastructure, including electricity, water and sewage, and roads.  
 
An important policy question is how to intensify competition in procurement auctions for 
development projects. Joint bidding may be one of the solutions. In theory, however, it is 
expected to have both effects for and against competition at the auction level. Whether 
coalitional bidding practices have a pro- or anti-competitive effect defers to empirical 
analyses. It is potentially affected by underlying sectoral characteristics. This paper, using 
procurement data from official development assistance projects, explores the impact of joint 
bidding on the equilibrium bid function in three infrastructure sectors. It is shown that in a 
few segments a particular type of bidding coalition would be strongly pro-competitive, 
whence curbing project procurement costs.  
 
The OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) member countries are spending 
about 12 billion U.S. dollars for assisting infrastructure development in developing countries 
every year. But this is far below the estimated financial requirements—such as 470 billion 
U.S. dollars by Fay and Yepes (2003), and about 360 billion U.S. dollars by our companion 
paper (Estache and Iimi, 2008).
1 Hence, it is essential to utilize the available aid resources 
more effectively and most efficiently (Iimi, 2006). It is indicated that to take full advantage 
of the positive competition effect, at least seven firms are required in the road and water 
sectors, and perhaps a fewer bidders for electricity projects.  
                                                 
1 The underlying assumptions and estimation methods for these figures are different. For instance, Fay and 
Yepes (2003) estimates the demand for infrastructure including electricity, water, roads, railways and 
telecommunications and assumes that the individual unit costs are constant. On the other hand, our companion 
paper focuses on only electricity, water and roads but accounts for the potential efficiency gains from enhanced 
procurement competition.    - 3 -
 
Joint bidding has a large potential to intensify competition in procurement auctions. For 
instance, road projects are normally labor-intensive and not technically complicated. Suppose 
that individual local firms cannot meet the experience and financial requirements to apply for 
public contracts solely. If joint bidding is instrumental in pooling their business resources, a 
simple policy recommendation would be to encourage joint bidding and invite more local 
consortia to the public procurement process. Indeed, Asia Development Bank’s guideline 
encourages prospective firms to complement their resources, if necessary, through the 
prequalification process.
2 But this may not be the case when complex development projects 
are considered, such as large-scale construction of a hydropower station. If no alliance firm 
within a coalition retains key expertise, such joint bidding does not help to increase their 
capability of implementing such a project.  
 
In theory, the predicted effects of joint bidding vary depending on assumptions. As 
summarized by Iimi (2004), the resource restriction view expects that joint bidding would 
reduce the barrier to entry and increase the number of participating bidders. Hendricks and 
Porter (1992) find that the most profitable format in oil and gas development projects is a 
joint venture of large and fringe bidders. The plausible reason is that oil developers have to 
pool their financial and technical resources with each other to deal with a great risk involved 
and at the same time local information is important for successful discovery.  
 
However, if firms are allowed to form bidding coalitions freely, the marginal impact of joint 
bidding may be nonexistent in equilibrium. This is referred to as the contestability view. 
Moreover, it is questionable why firms are motivated to make a coalition, because firms 
know their underlying private information—formally so-called signal. It means that if the 
resource restraint view holds, everyone knows that firms who are looking for coalitional 
                                                 
2 Prequalification of Bidders User’s Guidelines state that “[t]he [prequalification] process enable prospective 
bidders, who may be insufficiently qualified on their own, to avoid the expense, or to form a joint venture that 
may give a better chance of success.” Moreover, “[prequalification] encourages local firms to form joint 
ventures with other local or international firms, thereby benefiting from their resources and experience” (ADB, 
2006).    - 4 -
partners have unfavorable cost parameters. Hence, no bidding coalition could be agreed on. 
The situation resembles the famous “lemon market.”  
 
Krishna and Morgan (1997) shows that in the common value paradigm, joint bidding could 
enhance competition. The idea is that bidders who are randomly assigned to bidding groups 
are supposed to obtain a more correct estimate of the true value, whence submitting more 
aggressive bids. In this regard, there must be a tradeoff between the benefit from 
informational aggregation and the reduction in competition. Under experimental 
circumstances, conversely, Mares and Shor (2008) demonstrate that the former is dominated 
by the latter. The bid price would increase—in our public procurement context—because of 
less competition. Cho et al. (2002), modeling an endogenous mechanism for potential 
bidders to decide to form joint consortia, suggests that they would likely divide themselves 
into two coalitions, but not a grand collation. This is a non-cooperative equilibrium. However, 
this spontaneous formation of joint ventures is practically indistinguishable from tacit 
collusion. The collusive bidding behavior aimed at reducing competition is surely anti-
competitive (Bailey, 2007; Ware, et al., 2007).
3  
 
There are a few empirical efforts to quantify the effect of consortia bidding practices. 
Hendricks and Porter (1992) is supportive of the positive joint bidding effect as mentioned 
above. Moody and Kruvant (1988) also finds the positive net effect of joint bidding on 
offshore continental shelf (OCS) oil and gas lease prices, meaning that it encourages more 
participation and increases the government revenue. In large-scale ODA projects, local joint 
bidding seems particularly pro-competitive (Iimi, 2004).  
 
An important issue ignored in the existing literature is that the motivation and effect of 
coalitional bidding behavior might be different across sectors. In technically difficult and 
large-scale public works, the effect of consortia bidding behavior is likely to be positive from 
                                                 
3 As mentioned by Bailey (2007), “it can be difficult to distinguish anticompetitive bidding behavior from 
competitively neutral bidding behavior without a smoking gun.” Having said that, she proposes to account for 
the relevant factors that affect bid prices and identify a competitive benchmark in order to quantify the 
competitive effect of joint bidding.    - 5 -
the risk sharing point of view. Under different circumstances, however, the joint bidding 
strategy may be motivated for different reasons or not be motivated at all. For example, firms 
do not have to rely on joint bidding for simple road procurements. But if it is a high grade 
highway contract, they may prefer to collaborate with one another. By collecting data with 
detailed project-specific information from various infrastructure projects, the paper attempts 
to quantify the joint bidding effect separately in each of the three infrastructure sectors: roads, 
water and sewage, and electricity projects.  
 
The remaining sections are organized as follows: Section II provides the overview of joint 
bidding practices in our sample auctions. Section III briefly presents the empirical model and 




II. DATA  
 
In practice, there are a large variety of coalitional forms in auctions in terms of who 
collaborates with whom, and why. In the context of public procurement for official 
development projects, the classification into local and foreign bidders is of particular interest. 
This is because they have different advantage and disadvantage and thus have different 
interest and motivation in adopting the joint bidding strategy. Local firms in developing 
countries may be crucially faced with lack of financial, technical and experiential capability 
for large development projects. However, they may have the advantage of proximity to local 
input and labor markets. They are also familiar with local administration and regulation. On 
the other hand, foreign firms, typically multinational enterprises, may have a considerable 
accumulation of development experience and an abundance of human and financial resources. 
But their labor costs are usually significantly high compared with local firms.  
 
Based on this classification, there are five types of coalitional bidding (Figure 1). First, a 
local firm can solely participate in an auction. Second, local firms can collaborate with each   - 6 -
other. Third, a local firm can also make a consortium with foreign firm(s). Fourth, it is 
possible that more than one foreign bidder submit a joint bid together. Finally, a foreign 
bidder may choose to participate in an auction alone.  
 















Source: Author’s illustration.  
 
Our data on procurement auctions are collected from ODA-related infrastructure projects 
assisted by the Japanese Government and the World Bank. It contains 221 public contracts 
for road, water and sewage, and electricity projects in 29 developing countries. In 221 
auctions, 862 firms and bidding consortia are identified (see Estache and Iimi (2008) for 
details).  
 
These firms and consortia were composed by 1,656 individual firms.
4 Local firms who 
participated—either solely or jointly—in the procurement process amount to 60 percent in 
the road sector (Table 1). In the water and sewage sector the share of local firms reaches as 
much as 75 percent. By contrast, foreign firms are much dominant in the electricity sector; 
about 70 percent of bidders come from abroad.  
 
The probability of a firm making a bidding coalition is highest in electricity projects and 
lowest in road procurements. Half of firms choose to jointly bid in the former sector. The 
                                                 
4 If a firm participates in more than one auction, they are double counted. We accounted for different names of a 
single firm in our sample data, but only at the primary level, meaning that it is accounted for if they are clearly 
the same company (e.g., misspelling and abbreviation) or if a local firm clearly represents its parent company. 
However, we have not taken into account the potential capital relationships between firms because of technical 
difficulties. It is also ignored the possibility that some firms are intended to be subcontracted performance of 
part of the work by other firms.    - 7 -
probability of joint bidding is 37 percent in the latter. In the water sector about 44 percent of 
firms participated jointly in bidding processes. These shares look lower than those in the 
existing literature. Moody and Kruvant (1988) and Hoffman et al. (1991) report that the share 
of bidders following consortia bidding practices in the OCS oil and gas lease auctions is 
about 55–60 percent. This must be attributable to the nature of our sample projects. The 
majority of road procurements and some of water and sewerage projects are presumably not 
so complicated that firms could sorely enter the competition.  
 
Not surprisingly, the majority of bidding coalitions are composed of only local firms in the 
road and water sectors—14 percent and 24 percent of total firms, respectively. To the 
contrary, in electricity projects, the likelihood of local firms collaborating with each other is 
minimal at less than 4 percent, while foreign firms’ collaboration accounts for 33 percent in 
the case of electricity project contracts. Most interestingly, the probability of a firm forming a 
consortium composed of both local and foreign companies is equally about 14 percent across 
sectors.  
 
These figures can be interpreted as follows: Local firms have relative advantage in road 
projects, because of their relatively high labor-intensity and relatively low skill requirements. 
But they may still need to pool their financial and managerial resources for obtaining road 
contracts. The same story can be applied to the water sector. On the other hand, electricity 
projects seem characteristic, requiring high technical experiences from firms. Local firms 
cannot meet those requirements easily. If local enterprises dare participate in competition, 
they are highly likely to form a bidding consortium with a probability of two third (i.e., 18.2 
over 31.9). This figure is higher than the other two sectors (about half). Even foreign firms 
tend to rely on joint bidding in this area. Approximately 70 percent of them select to jointly 
bid for a contract. As a result, without doubt the degree of competition in electricity project 
auctions tends to be very limited.  
 
 
   - 8 -
Table 1. Probability of Joint Bidding Practices at Firm Level  
Obs. Share Obs. Share Obs. Share
Local firm 778 60.0 546 74.9 313 31.9
Foreign firm 778 40.0 565 24.2 313 68.1
Forming joint bidding 778 36.8 565 43.5 313 50.8
    Including local firm(s) 778 28.7 565 37.5 313 18.2
    Including foreign firm(s) 778 22.4 565 19.8 313 47.0
    All local firms 778 14.4 565 23.7 313 3.8
    All foreign firms 778 8.1 565 6.0 313 32.6
    Both local and foreign firms 778 14.3 565 13.8 313 14.4
Roads Water Electricity
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
Table 2 shows the similar summary statistics of joint bidding practices but at the bidder level. 
In this table, there is no double count. About 70–80 percent of bidders include at least one 
local firm in procurement auctions for road and water projects. Only 35 percent of bidders 
involve local firm(s) in the electricity sector. Joint consortia commonly account for about 25–
30 percent of total bidders. The shares of coalitions composed of both local and foreign 
companies are also not so different between sectors, ranging from 6.5 percent to 9 percent.  
 
Table 2. Joint Bidding Practices at Bidder Level  
Obs. Share Obs. Share Obs. Share
Including local firm(s) 394 70.3 329 79.6 139 35.3
Including foreign firm(s) 394 37.6 329 29.2 139 71.2
Joint bidding 394 23.4 329 25.8 139 31.7
    Including local firm(s) 394 19.5 329 21.9 139 9.4
    Including foreign firm(s) 394 11.7 329 12.8 139 28.8
    All local firms 394 11.7 329 13.1 139 2.9
    All foreign firms 394 3.8 329 4.0 139 22.3
    Both local and foreign firms 394 7.9 329 8.8 139 6.5
Roads Water Electricity
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
In connection with submitted bids, joint bidders tend to submit lower bids on average in road 
procurements, but higher in the water sector. Figure 2 depicts the cumulative distribution 
functions of solo and joint bids relative to the engineering cost estimate.
5 In the road sector, 
the probability function of joint bids is dominant over that of solo bids. Regardless of solo or 
joint bids, the majority of bids are lower than the cost estimate; that is, the normalized bids 
are less than unity. In water-related auctions, solo bids tend to lower in general. The 
distribution is more centered on the unity. For electricity projects, neither solo bids nor joint 
bids are dominant. Normalized solo bids appear to be distributed widely with long tails. On 
                                                 
5 Some outliers are excluded from the figures.    - 9 -
the other hand, the cumulative probability distribution of joint bids is highly concentrated on 
about one.
6 Figure 3 reflects different presentations of the relationship between normalized 
bids and joint bidding practices.  
 
Figure 2. Cumulative Probability Distribution Function of Normalized Bids  
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Figure 3. Probability Distribution of Normalized Bid by Solo and Joint Bid 
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
With relation to contract awards, joint bidding might increase the average probability of 
winning a contract in the water and electricity projects. Figure 4 reflects the statistics of joint 
bidding practices—but for winning and losing bidders separately. In the water sector 33 
percent of winners are joint bidders; this is much higher than the share of joint bidders among 
                                                 
6 The figure discards observations if normalized bids are above two.    - 10 -
losing firms (23 percent). Similarly, in electricity projects winners are more likely to form a 
bidding coalition than losing bidders. In road auctions, winning and losing bidders are 
equally likely to adopt the joint bidding strategy, meaning that such practices do not appear 
crucial—at least on a simple comparison basis.  
 
These findings may look contradictory with to the above; for example, joint bidders in water 
project procurements submit less aggressive bids but they seem more successful. This 
suggests that besides engineering cost estimates, there must be omitted factors that are 
important to determine auction outcomes, such as the degree of competition. Moreover, the 
composition of firms constituting a joint venture may matter. In the water sector, joint 
bidding including local firms is considered particularly effective in Figure 4; 20 percent of 
winners use a form of purely local joint venture. Only 10 percent of losing bidders use this 
type of coalition. In the case of electricity projects, coalitional bidding by local and foreign 
companies exhibits a sharp contrast with the other two sectors; while 10.6 percent of awarded 
contractors in this area are constituted by local and foreign firms together, the share of this 
type of bidding format among losers amounts to only 4 percent.  
 
Figure 4. Joint Bidding Practices by Winning and Losing Bidders  




































































































































Source: Author’s calculation. 
 
Is there any systematic difference in joint bidding behavior across project locations 
(countries)? There are a number of interesting findings. For infrastructure projects 
implemented in China, most firms have local legislation and participate solely in the bidding 
process (Table 3). In the road sector, the likelihood of firms’ jointly bidding is merely 6.9 
percent. Foreign bidders are inactive in China’s road procurements. In other selected 
countries, such as Ethiopia and the Philippines, however, foreign firms may be dominant.   - 11 -
They do not normally form a bidding consortium for road projects. Notably, however, if they 
prefer to jointly bid—whatever the reason is—foreign firms tend to collaborate with each 
other in Ethiopian projects. In the Philippines, conversely, they seem to seek for 
opportunities to form an alliance with local firms.  
 
In the water and sewage sector, local firms are predominant in most countries. In China, a 
small number of foreign firms are involved in the bidding process. The share of joint bidders 
varies from country to country. Firms following joint bidding behavior in Chinese projects 
amount to 30 percent. A third of the foreign bidders chose to team up with local partners. 
Local firms also collaborate with one another. In Thailand, the joint bidding share is the same 
as China but with more observations of joint ventures between domestic and foreign 
companies. In Mexico, it is common that local firms form bidding consortia with each other 
to secure public contracts.  
 
In our sample, foreign firms are predominant in public procurements for electricity projects. 
Even in China, about 30 percent of applicants come from abroad; this is the highest presence 
of foreign firms among the three sectors in China. Moreover, about 70–80 percent of them 
adopt the consortium bidding strategy, except for several countries including China. It is not 
unusual for foreign firms to collaborate with each other in this sector. But it is rare that they 
cooperate with local firms.  
 
Table 3. Probability of Joint Bidding at Firm Level in Selected Countries   
China Ethiopia Philippines China Mexico Thailand China Kenya Viet Nam
(No. of firms = 1 4 43 48 81 5 6 1 0 67 7 8 52 6 6
Local firm 99.3 17.6 26.1 89.7 91.5 67.5 72.9 0.0 10.9
Foreign firm 0.7 82.4 73.9 10.3 8.5 32.5 27.1 100.0 89.1
Forming joint bidding 6.9 17.6 22.7 30.1 97.2 29.9 18.8 69.2 84.4
    Including local firm(s) 6.9 0.0 13.6 27.6 95.3 29.9 14.1 0.0 17.2
    Including foreign firm(s) 0.0 17.6 20.5 12.8 17.9 26.0 7.1 69.2 81.3
    All local firms 6.9 0.0 2.3 17.3 79.2 3.9 11.8 0.0 3.1
    All foreign firms 0.0 17.6 9.1 2.6 1.9 0.0 4.7 69.2 67.2




Source: Author’s calculation.   
 
It is worth noting that our sample is not free of sample selection bias. Our data are by no 
means comprehensive in terms of country coverage. However, one might be able to agree on   - 12 -
the following stylized facts: First, Chinese firms are mostly stand-alone, possibly because 
they are competitive enough and do not need to pool their resources with rival firms. As the 
result, the public procurement process in China and anywhere Chinese firms are active is 
considered much competitive.  
 
Second, joint bidding seems to compensate for lack of mature local firms to a certain extent 
(Figure 5). Where the local participation rates are low, the share of firms who rely on joint 
bidding is relatively high. This is consistent with the resource restriction hypothesis.  
 
Related to this, third, foreign bidders are playing an important role in ODA procurements, in 
particular in the electricity sector. Conversely, the presence of local firms is marked in the 
water and sewage sector. At the same time, there seem to be many opportunities for local and 
foreign companies to work together in this area. In road procurements, the importance of 
joint bidding practices is moderate.  
 
Fourth, joint bidding by local and foreign firms seems to necessitate developed local business 
environment. Not surprisingly, without reliable local partners, no local-foreign collaboration 
would take place. In African countries, foreign bidders tend to be predominant in all 
sectors—as far as our sample data are concerned. In addition, foreign firms are rarely 
collaborating with local firms. Africa’s relatively high infrastructure development costs 
might be attributed to these backgrounds. Premature local business environment could be one 
of the important barriers to facilitate joint bidding, whence augment competition and reduce 
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Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
 
III. THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
Our discussion in the previous section presents the trends of joint bidding practices and 
provides the insight that different bidding options have the relative advantage in different 
sectors. However, it is informal in the sense that the key question of whether such bidding 
behavior would affect auction efficiency is not really addressed. The following analysis 
formally investigates into the effect of joint bidding on the equilibrium bid function with 
project-specific characteristics controlled. Based on the conventional empirical auction 
literature (e.g., Porter and Zona, 1993; Gupta, 2002; Iimi, 2004; 2006), the following 
symmetric bid function is estimated:  
 
it t i t it it N Z X JBID b ε δ γ β α + + + + = ln ' '   - 14 -
 
where bit is i’s bid amount at auction t. The dependent variable is the bid amount of all 
bidders, i.e., both winning and losing bidders.
7 N is the number of bidders who participate in 
an auction, which is supposed to capture the competition effect. Xt is a vector of observable 
characteristics of individual contracts, such as engineering cost estimate, contract duration 
and other sector-specific technical attributes. To control bidder heterogeneity, the dummy 
variables for bidder nationalities are included in Zi. JBIDit is a binary variable for a particular 
form of joint bidding. Note that unlike the self-selection model, we observe both solo and 
joint bids, regardless of selection of joint bidding, i.e., JBIDit.  
 
As pointed out by Moody and Kruvant (1988) and Iimi (2004), an important empirical issue 
is that the above equilibrium bid equation involves crucial endogeneity associated with 
bidders’ joint bidding choice. One can expect that individual firms with low efficiency—or 
high cost parameters—would be more likely to form a bidding coalition if the resource 
constraint hypothesis is true. If the hypothesis holds only partly, perhaps they are still 
unlikely to win the contract. Obviously, such underlying cost preferences are private 
information. In our model, a bidder-specific observable is only their nationalities. 
Accordingly, the error term in the bid equation and the error term in the joint bidding 
decision may be correlated positively.  
 
However, one might think conversely. High cost firms would be likely to be faced with great 
difficulties to find a bidding partner, because only inefficient firms are looking for 
opportunities to collaborate with someone else; no one desires to make a coalition with those 
who are unlikely to contribute to competitiveness improvement. If this is the case, weak 
bidders are less likely to engage in coalitional bidding and win the object, whence relating 
the two error terms to each other negatively. In the least squares method, the positive and 
negative correlations will translate into under- and over-estimation (in negative terms) of the 
true joint bidding effect, respectively.  
                                                 
7 Losing bids are as informative as winning bids in estimating the equilibrium bid function, because he ODA-
related procurement process normally relies on a first-price sealed-bid auction format.    - 15 -
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It is assumed that individual firms decide whether or not to make a bidding coalition, 
depending on project characteristics and their past award experience in relevant ODA 
projects. The underlying hypothesis is that firms would be more likely to be induced to 
cooperate with other companies if the size of contract is large. If a contract requires advanced 
technologies, the incentive to form a consortium with experienced multinational enterprises 
may be strong. These conditions are supposed to be captured by our engineering cost 
estimate and contract duration variables. On the other hand, the public procurement standard 
for infrastructure projects normally requires applicants to have had the similar type of work 
experience in the past. Hence, in theory, the total number of contracts awarded to each firm 
or consortium could be another explanatory variable in the joint bidding decision equation.
9  
 
The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator would potentially generate a biased estimate, 
unless there is no significant correlation between the two error terms in the equations,   and  it u
it ε , of which the covariance is defined as ρ. This is because the OLS coefficient captures the 
following unconditional effect of joint bidding:  
 
( )
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−
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8 Our case is exactly the same as the traditional self-selection bias problem associated with college education 
(see, for example, Greene, 1997). Consider an earning equation, which includes the dummy variable for college 
education. The OLS estimator must be biased, because this choice of going to college is dependent on the 
individual’s unobservable abilities, which also affect their current earnings.  
9 To avoid the small sample problem, we calculate the number of contracts obtained by each entity using the 
data before the year of 2002, which account for roughly 20 percent of our sample. For the same reason, in 
addition, we assume that this variable is exogenously given and applicable to the entire sample. Notably, our 
sample covers a fairly short period.    - 16 -
 
Of particular note, if the estimated covariance ρ is not significantly different from zero, then 
the OLS provides an unbiased estimate of α.  ( ) • Φ  and  ( ) • φ  are the standard normal 
cumulative and density distributions, respectively.  
 
Moreover, it is worth noting that the decision of joint bidding may potentially be endogenous 
but irrelevant to the number of bidders N, which is introduced to measure the conventional 
competition effect. In our setting, N is assumed to be given. Hence, in some sense, our 
analysis will be partial, because the dynamics may not be taken into consideration between 
the reducing effect of several firms’ making a coalition on competition and the increasing 
competition effect of more firms’ participating by joint bidding.  
 
As discussed above, we examine six types of bidding consortia: (i) joint bidding (regardless 
of local or foreign), (ii) joint venture including at least one local firm, (iii) joint venture 
composed of only local firms, (iv) joint bidding including at least one foreign firm, (v) joint 
venture composed of only foreign companies, and (vi) coalitional bidding by local and 
foreign firms.  
 
 
IV. ESTIMATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
 
First, the ordinary least squares (OLS) models are performed. Table 4 shows the results for 
road procurement auctions. It reveals that competition reduces the expected procurement 
price, since the coefficient associated with the number of bidders is significant and negative. 
This is one of the main findings in our companion paper (Estache and Iimi, 2008). Other 
implications are deferred to it.  
 
Regarding the joint bidding effect, there is no strong evidence that joint bidding practices are 
pro-competitive, except for a few cases. In the road sector the coefficient associated with 
JBID is estimated at 3.01 with a 10 percent level significance, implying that joint bidding   - 17 -
may be anticompetitive.
10 Especially if foreign firms rely on consortium bidding among 
themselves, their bids are likely to be much higher (than the baseline). Conversely, joint 
bidding involving local and foreign companies looks pro-competitive. The coefficient is 
estimated at -6.83. Moreover, the seventh column model with multiple joint bidding variables 
reveals the fact that local firms have the cost advantage in road procurements but joint 
bidding is not always a good option. If it involves at least one local firm, joint bidding is pro-
competitive. When it is also composed of foreign firms, additional competitiveness could be 
realized.  
 
A statistical concern is endogeneity associated with the joint bidding decision. To deal with 
this problem, the treatment effect models are performed. The first stage regressions are 
generally satisfactory in all sectors. Not surprisingly, the joint bidding strategy is motivated 
by the size of contract. As the engineering cost estimate increases, the probability of a firm 
bidding jointly—regardless of coalition types—tends to increase. To a lesser extent the 
probability of joint bidding increases with expected contract duration. In many cases, 
moreover, experienced firms with one or more awarded contracts in the past are prone to 
relying on joint bidding practices. This may be counterintuitive from the point of view of the 
resource restraint hypothesis. Rather, it is consistent with the “lemon market” view. This can 
be interpreted to mean that inexperienced firms are faced with a typical adverse selection 
problem, failing to find joint bidding partners.  
 
The second stage results are shown in Table 5. It has been found that the OLS estimates were 
upwards biased, since the estimated covariance ρ is positive.
11 But the inferred bias may not 
be so serious; ρ is not statistically different from zero. It is confirmed that only the local and 
foreign collaboration is pro-competitive. Joint bidding involving only foreign companies 
                                                 
10 Recall that this is consistent with the fact that joint bidding practices are relatively rare in road procurements 
(Figure 2).  
11 This means that the joint bidding effect estimated by OLS is underestimated. Recall that the true effect α is 
presumably negative if it is pro-competitive.    - 18 -
would lose competitiveness at auctions. The anti-competitive effect of general joint bidding 
turns out insignificant.  
 
Interestingly, there is no evidence supportive of the prior expectation that bidding alliance 
among local firms would help to pool their resources and facilitate local procurement. The 
results can be understood to mean that joint bidding formed by only local companies is not 
effective enough, compared with solo bidding. Individual local firms can contract to 
implement relatively simple road development works. However, if they are faced with the 
needs to pool their resources, local joint ventures do not help much; something that no 
domestic firm can meet easily is missing. Local firms can depend on foreign enterprises for 
their financial, managerial and technical capabilities. On the other hand, foreign firms cannot 
be competitive enough by themselves, presumably because of their high operating costs.  
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Table 4. OLS Estimation: Road Sector 






















Joint bid inc. local firm(s) 0.77 -9.77
*
(1.76) (5.01)
Local joint bid 0.77
(1.76)


















(0.88) (0.90) (0.89) (0.89) (0.88) (0.88) (0.89) (0.89)
Lot length (km) 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Lot length
2 (km) 1/ -0.20 -0.22 -0.20 -0.20 -0.23 -0.20 -0.23 -0.23





















(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
New roads 2.81 2.89 2.85 2.85 2.50 2.81 2.54 2.54
(2.68) (2.68) (2.69) (2.69) (2.61) (2.68) (2.62) (2.62)
Rehabilitation 0.89 0.54 0.82 0.82 0.60 0.89 0.54 0.54




















(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)










*** 2.80 0.21 -35.86
**
(4.61) (4.61) (4.70) (4.69) (6.16) (4.31) (4.59) (17.74)
Obs. 394 394 394 394 394 394 394 394
R-squared 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.940 0.942 0.940 0.942 0.942
1/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and ***
indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively.  
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Table 5. Treatment Effect Model: Road Sector  













(2.95) (2.69) (2.64) (5.94)
Joint bid 1.98
(2.22)
Joint bid inc. local firm(s) -0.42
(2.10)
Local joint bid 0.07
(2.18)
Joint bid inc. foreign firm(s) 10.40
**
(4.46)









(0.85) (0.84) (0.84) (0.83) (0.84)
Lot length (km) 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.06
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Lot length
2 (km) 1/ -0.22 -0.21 -0.20 -0.23 -0.20















(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
New roads 2.89 2.86 2.86 2.50 2.80
(2.53) (2.54) (2.54) (2.46) (2.53)
Rehabilitation 0.52 0.80 0.82 0.59 0.87














(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Donor 1 28.23
* 27.61 27.64 28.50
* 27.53






(4.35) (4.43) (4.43) (5.81) (4.07)
Obs. 394 394 394 394 394
Wald chi2 10912.0 11981.3 12736.0 10904.8 12221.5
 ρ 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.01 0.07
(0.10) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Wald test statistics: 
    ρ = 0 0.72 1.58 0.76 0.01 1.06
1/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are 
shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, 
respectively.   
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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Similarly, the OLS and treatment effect models are estimated for the water and sewage sector 
(Table 6). Again, local firms have the strong cost advantage in general. In this case, the OLS 
estimates are found downward biased. The null hypothesis that ρ is indifferent from zero can 
be rejected strongly, implying that in this sector, the joint bidding decision is systematically 
dependent on unobserved bidder and contract characteristics; the two error terms are 
negatively correlated with one another. This is not incompatible with the “lemon market” 
view. Suppose that firm’s efficiency for—or ability of—implementing a water contract is not 
observed. Only truly efficient firms are able to form a bidding consortium and submit 
systematically low bids, whence generating a negative correlation between the two equations.  
 
Based on the treatment effect models, joint bidding is found generally anti-competitive. 
Particularly, this is true when foreign firms are involved in a consortium. High costs of 
foreign firms cannot be accommodated even under the bidding alliance with local firms. The 
impact of local joint bidding is inconclusive. While the incremental impact of local joint 
bidding may be positive in the model with multiple bidding option dummies, the effect is 
almost offset by the negative general joint bidding effect.  
 
In electricity projects, there is no reliable evidence as to the joint bidding effect (Table 7).
12 
Of particular note, the coefficients of local and foreign bidders are positive and negative, 
respectively, though both are statistically insignificant. Unlike the other two sectors, this may 
indicate that despite high cost parameters of foreign companies, they would have the 
comparative advantage against local firm in this area, because of advanced technical 
requirements. In our results, however, it is still debatable what the best bidding coalition is. 
Since there is no evident conclusion about the empirical effect in this area, auctioneers 
should assess the appropriateness of joint bidding with great caution. Although it is not sure 
that joint bidding would lead to greater efficiency, it is sure that joint bidding reduces 
competitive pressures in the auctions.  
                                                 
12 Our results have been found broadly robust against selected independent variables, particularly country and 
nationality dummies, some of which have strong explanatory power. Even if these are excluded from our 
specifications, the main results are unchanged.    - 22 -
 
There are several alleged reasons for the failure to find significant joint bidding effects in the 
electricity sector. First of all, our data may be poor in this area. More precisely, despite 
largely heterogeneous contract components, few control variables are available. Second, 
there are in fact a small number of players in the procurement process for electricity projects 
(see Estache and Iimi (2008)). The average number of bidders per auction is 4.6, but the 
majority of auctions attracted only two or three firms. This implies that technologies required 
for these projects are unevenly distributed. Therefore, simply flocking together may not 
always help improve firms’ competitiveness. Related to this, finally, even if joint bidding per 
se leads to aggressive bidding behavior, its direct impact on reduction in competition cannot 
be overlooked given that competition is already limited in this sector. The positive joint 




                                                 
13 Our analysis does not address this dynamic interaction in connection with bidder’s entry decision. The 
number of bidders is assumed fixed in our framework.    - 23 -
Table 6. OLS and Treatment Effect Models: Water and Sewage Sector  
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS TE 1/ TE 1/ TE 1/ TE 1/







(9.17) (9.27) (9.52) (9.65) (6.95) (6.68) (6.73) (10.10) (6.85) (6.39)
Foreign bid 7.81 6.14 7.74 -8.47 15.76
** 3.49 8.79 -13.82
*
(5.53) (6.10) (5.91) (9.35) (6.68) (5.75) (6.61) (8.45)
Joint bid 3.22 20.61
** -0.16 13.91
***
(2.22) (8.60) (1.38) (4.14)
Joint bid inc. local firm(s) 0.11 -20.77
** 4.76
(1.45) (8.63) (15.19)






















(0.82) (0.85) (0.83) (0.81) (0.82) (0.83) (0.83) (0.83) (0.78) (0.70) (0.73)
Water 1.43 1.50 1.43 2.88 1.43 2.88 2.88 1.95 1.73 3.49
* 1.37
**


















* -4.47 -4.47 -3.99 -7.96 -2.88 -8.06
**













(1.23) (1.22) (1.23) (1.10) (1.23) (1.10) (1.10) (1.10) (1.21) (0.90) (1.09)











(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) (0.13)












(0.16) (0.17) (0.16) (0.21) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.18) (0.15) (0.20) (0.14)
Contract duration 0.10
* 0.11
* 0.10 0.08 0.10


























(18.80) (19.23) (19.21) (19.59) (19.06) (18.42) (20.32) (17.73) (23.13) (17.39) (16.96)
Obs. 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329 329





(0.15) (1.24) (0.10) (0.27)
1/ Estimated by the treatment effect model. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
levels, respectively.   
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Table 7. OLS and Treatment Effect Models: Electricity Sector  
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS TE 1/ TE 1/ TE 1/ TE 1/
Local bid 7.57 6.47 12.17 5.56 13.17 14.65 6.64 12.09 5.68 13.18
(7.29) (7.21) (9.64) (7.17) (11.12) (10.91) (5.97) (8.03) (5.92) (9.32)
Foreign bid -5.60 -6.66 -1.93 -8.31 -14.65 -6.48 -2.04 -8.17
(10.07) (9.56) (11.29) (9.33) (10.91) (7.96) (9.40) (7.77)
Joint bid 2.31 3.80 -4.17 3.29
(4.49) (5.25) (5.66) (4.21)
Joint bid inc. local firm(s) -4.73 -7.96 -3.53
(5.69) (7.31) (4.76)
Joint bid inc. foreign firm(s) 3.96 7.96 4.65
(5.22) (7.31) (4.72)
Local foreign joint bid -5.60 -1.17 5.52 -4.50













(6.79) (6.85) (6.80) (6.82) (6.79) (6.84) (6.84) (5.71) (5.67) (5.68) (5.69)
Turbine 11.05 10.19 11.63 10.07 11.05 10.63 10.63 10.18 11.64 10.06 11.06
(9.05) (9.18) (9.32) (8.99) (9.05) (9.28) (9.28) (7.65) (7.77) (7.49) (7.59)
Trans. dist. lines 5.48 5.67 5.24 5.59 5.48 5.37 5.37 5.61 5.23 5.55 5.49


























(3.57) (3.52) (3.60) (3.54) (3.57) (3.55) (3.55) (2.94) (3.00) (2.95) (3.00)












(8.21) (8.54) (8.35) (8.44) (8.21) (8.60) (8.60) (7.12) (6.96) (7.05) (6.88)












(1.73) (1.73) (1.75) (1.74) (1.73) (1.76) (1.76) (1.45) (1.46) (1.45) (1.45)
Trans. line voltage 2/ 2.91 3.83 3.01 4.57 2.91 4.58 4.58 3.90 3.04 4.61 2.90
(41.08) (42.02) (41.64) (42.75) (41.08) (43.22) (43.22) (35.02) (34.72) (35.63) (34.42)
Trans. line length 2/ -5.25 -5.38 -5.51 -5.68 -5.25 -5.88 -5.88 -5.44 -5.52 -5.72 -5.25




















































(17.46) (17.63) (18.91) (17.55) (13.93) (14.04) (17.50) (14.66) (15.76) (14.57) (11.67)
Obs. 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139 139
R-squared 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976 0.976
 ρ -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(0.13) (0.04) (0.11) (0.04)
1/ Estimated by the treatment effect model. 
2/ For presentation purposes, the coefficients are multiplied by 1,000. 
Note: The dependent variable is the bidding amount. The robust standard errors are shown in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate the 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance levels, respectively.   
Source: Author’s calculation.  
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To illustrate the way of thinking of the best bidding strategy, the OLS estimates involving 
multiple joint bidding variables are suggestive to represent where the potential competitive 
effect of joint bidding generates (Figure 6). In road procurements, local firms have the large 
cost advantage. If they prefer to form a joint bidding, some of this advantage would be lost. 
But if it is a coalition with other local firms, the cost advantage will be retained. In addition, 
if that coalition involves a foreign company, they would secure additional competitiveness. 
In the water sector, local firms also have the cost advantage, but not so large. Joint bidding 
will affect negatively. If it is a local consortium, then they could maintain their cost 
advantage. However, if it is a consortium between local and foreign firms, they would lose 
almost all cost advantage.  
 
From the viewpoint of foreign firms, it is clear that they have the cost disadvantage. Joint 
bidding does not help much in both sectors. Even worse, it is costly to arrange a bidding 
coalition with other foreign firms. Only the way of improving their competitiveness is joint 
venture involving local enterprises. This would bring about sizable benefits, especially in 
road procurements.  
 








































Jointly bidding local firm








































Jointly bidding foreign firm
Foreign firm jointly bidding with local firm(s)
 
Source: Author’s calculation.  
 
The policy implications are straightforward:  
 
  Joint bidding practices are not always pro-competitive in infrastructure projects, 
except several cases. It means that auctioneers need to be cautious about amplified   - 26 -
joint bidding practices in public procurement auctions. The JBIC procurement 
handbook stipulates that bidders are allowed to make a coalition after the 
prequalification process only if such joint bidding does not distort competition.
14 
This type of competition policies needs to be emphasized once again.  
  In road procurements, auctioneers should encourage local firms to collaborate with 
foreign companies and discourage foreign firms from making a bidding coalition 
with each other.  
  In water projects, auctioneers may be able to expect the positive competition effect 
by encouraging local firms to collaborate with one another. But coalitional bidding 
involved only foreign companies would harm auction efficiency.  
  The joint bidding effect remains far from conclusive in the electricity sector. This 
area is considered most difficult to manage, because competition is already limited 
and technical requirements are high. It is important to balance between the expected 
positive joint bidding effect and the adverse effect on reduction in competition.  
 
 
V. CONCLUSION   
 
Aid effectiveness depends on efficiency in public procurement. By increasing competition in 
procurement auctions for infrastructure projects, an abundance of aid resources are expected 
to be saved. Encouraging joint bidding practices are among the possible theoretical solutions 
to invite more bidders in an auction. Especially, if many local firms are prohibited from 
participating in the procurement process due to their individual resource limitations, joint 
bidding practices may be instrumental in pooling their resources with each other and actively 
competing for a public contract.  
 
In theory, joint bidding potentially has both pro- and anti-competitive effects. It may enable 
firms to pool their resources and remove the barrier to entry. It may reduce the degree of 
                                                 
14 This is one of the necessary conditions. Among other conditions, joint bidding shall be approved before the 
bidding stage. It is also required to be a voluntary decision by bidding firms.    - 27 -
competition. Still, one can expect that bidding consortia compete with one another 
intensively. Finally, joint bidding is indistinguishable from the collusive behavior.  
 
The paper empirically addresses whether joint bidding is pro- or anti-competitive in ODA 
procurement auctions. It is found that in general there is no strong evidence that joint bidding 
practices are compatible with competition, except for a few cases. In road procurements, 
coalitional bidding involving both local and foreign firms has been found pro-competitive. In 
the water and sewage sector, local joint bidding may be useful to induce firms to submit 
lower offers. 
 
Joint bidding composed of only foreign companies is largely anti-competitive, meaning that 
their bids tend to be systematically high. This indicates the possible risk of relying too much 
on foreign bidding coalition, suggesting the necessity of overseeing it in the procurement 
process more carefully and systematically, as some donor agencies do. The only way for 
foreign firms to improve competitiveness is to form a bidding alliance with local firms. 
However, it is also indicated that local and foreign collaboration would necessitate a 
developed local business environment. Without reliable local partners, such a coalition could 
not materialize.  
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